|Battle off Samar|
|Taffy 3 comes under attack|
|Carriers under attack|
|Japanese take hits|
|Seventh Fleet's calls for help|
|Criticism of Halsey|
Criticism of Halsey
Admiral William F. 'Bill' Halsey - Commander US Third Fleet at Leyte Gulf
In his dispatch after the battle, Halsey justified the decision as follows:
"Searches by my carrier planes revealed the presence of the Northern carrier force on the afternoon of 24 October, which completed the picture of all enemy naval forces. As it seemed childish to me to guard statically San Bernardino Strait, I concentrated TF 38 during the night and steamed north to attack the Northern Force at dawn.
I believed that the Center Force had been so heavily damaged in the Sibuyan Sea that it could no longer be considered a serious menace to Seventh Fleet."
Halsey also argued that he had feared that leaving Task Force 34 to defend the strait without carrier support would have left it vulnerable to attack from land-based aircraft, while leaving one of the fast carrier groups behind to cover the battleships would have significantly reduced the concentration of air power going north to strike Ozawa.
However, Morison states that Admiral Lee told him that he would have been fully prepared for the battleships to cover San Bernardino Strait without any carrier support.
Moreover, if Halsey had been in proper communication with Seventh Fleet it would have been entirely practicable for the escort carriers of Task Force 77 to provide adequate air cover for Task Force 34—a much easier matter than it would be for those escort carriers to defend themselves against the onslaught of Kurita's heavy ships.
It may be argued that the fact that Halsey was aboard one of the battleships, and "would have had to remain behind" with Task Force 34 (while the bulk of his fleet charged northwards to attack the Japanese carriers) may have contributed to this decision. However, it would have been perfectly feasible (and logical) to have taken one or both of Third Fleet's two fastest battleships (Iowa and/or New Jersey) with the carriers in the pursuit of Ozawa, while leaving the rest of the Battle Line off San Bernardino Strait. (Indeed, Halsey's original plan for the composition of Task Force 34 was that it would contain only four, not all six, of the Third Fleet's battleships). Therefore, to guard San Bernardino Strait with a powerful battleship force would not have been incompatible with Halsey's personally going north aboard the New Jersey.
It does seem likely that Halsey was strongly influenced by his Chief of Staff, Rear Admiral Robert "Mick" Carney, who was also wholeheartedly in favour of taking all Third Fleet's available forces northwards to attack the Japanese carrier force.
Clifton Sprague, commander of Task Unit 77.4.3 in the battle off Samar, was later bitterly critical of Halsey's decision, and of his failure to clearly inform Kinkaid and Seventh Fleet that their northern flank was no longer protected:
“ In the absence of any information that this exit of the San Bernardino Strait] was no longer blocked, it was logical to assume that our northern flank could not be exposed without ample warning. ”
Regarding Halsey's failure to turn Task Force 34 southwards when Seventh Fleet's first calls for assistance off Samar were received, Morison writes:
“ If TF 34 had been detached a few hours earlier, after Kinkaid's first urgent request for help, and had left the destroyers behind, since their fueling caused a delay of over two hours and a half, a powerful battle line of six modern battleships under the command of Admiral Lee, the most experienced battle squadron commander in the Navy, would have arrived off San Bernardino Strait in time to have clashed with Kurita's Center Force… Apart from the accidents common in naval warfare, there is every reason to suppose that Lee would have crossed Kurita's T and completed the destruction of Center Force. ”
Instead, as Morison also observes:
“ The mighty gunfire of the Third Fleet's Battle Line, greater than that of the whole Japanese Navy, was never brought into action except to finish off one or two crippled light ships. ”
—Morison (1956), pp. 336–337
Perhaps the most telling comment is made laconically by Vice Admiral Lee in his action report as Commander of Task Force 34—
“ No battle damage was incurred nor inflicted on the enemy by vessels while operating as Task Force Thirty-Four. ”
—Task Force 34 Action Report: 6 October 1944 – 3 November 1944